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ARGUMENT
I.
MEMORANDUM DECISIONS OP THE TRIAL COURT LEAVE ALL OP
THE ISSUES RAISED BY THE PLAINTIFFS SUBJECT TO REVIEW
The broad manner in which the trial court granted plaintiff's
Motion for Summary Judgment necessitates appellate review of
several issues. The defendant Chadaz calls the court's attention
to the first Memorandum Decision issued by the District Court,
attached to defendant Chadaz's Brief as Addendum

"E".

This

decision states:
"Without reciting all of the issues and the basis
for decision, the court acknowledges that perhaps holding
the Wade case (In the matter of the estate of Collin
Thompson v. Wade. 509 NE 2nd 309 (New York 1987)) is not
entirely justified, but neither is the defendant's
reliance helpful. *Stranger to the deed' principles are
not particularly beneficial to either party." (emphasis
added).
"For the other reasons stated in the plaintiff's Motion
for Summary Judgment the same is granted."
The defendant Chadaz's interpretation of this was that the Motion
for Summary Judgment was granted for all of the reasons set forth
in the plaintiff's Motion

(except the "stranger to the deed"

principles).
The last paragraph of the second Memorandum Decision issued by
the District Court attached to Chadaz's Brief as Addendum "F",
contains the following statement:
"As stated in the court's original Memorandum Decision
the Motion for Summary Judgment brought by the plaintiffs
is granted and this Memorandum Decision will serve only
as a supplement thereto." (emphasis added)

VThile the second Memorandum Decision is helpful, it does not limit
the broad statement made in the original decision "For the other
reasons set forth in the plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment
the same is granted."

This does not limit the court 7 s holding to

just those issues elaborated upon in the second Memorandum Opinion,
but is broad enough to include all of the other reasons set forth
in plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, except the "stranger to
the deed" principles.
Therefore, the defendant

Chadaz

does

not

agree with

the

conclusions of the plaintiffs Potters set forth in the balance of
the Issues for Review in Potters' Brief.
II.
DEFENDANT DISAGREES WITH PLAINTIFF'S
"STATEMENT OF THE FACTS"
The "Statement of the Facts" provided by plaintiffs contains
improper

argument,

misleading.
1.

is

not

entirely

and

somewhat

The specific paragraphs of concern are as follows:

In response to paragraph 2 it is Chadaz's position that

pursuant to the original agreement
Warranty

accurate

Deed

shown

as

Potters7

(Chadaz's Addendum "A") the

Addendum

No.

1 was

executed

conveying title to Hillam Abstracting and Insurance Agency, Inc.,
a Utah corporation. Trustee, pursuant to a Trust Agreement dated
the 12th day of May, 1980. (emphasis added).

This property was to

be

released

held

by

Hillam

as

Trustee

not

accordance with the Trust Agreement.

2

to

be

except

in

2.

In response to plaintiffs Potters' paragraphs 4, 5, 6 and

7, Chadaz calls attention to the fact that although the deed is
dated October 24, 1980, it was not recorded until December 9, 1980
which was after the Supplemental Agreement (Chadaz Addendum "B")
dated November 25, 1980.
(being

the

instrument

It was also recorded at the same time

immediately

preceding)

as the

Special

Warranty Deed from Heritage Park Plaza, Inc. to Villatek (Chadaz's
Addendum "D").

It is this Special Warranty Deed that contains the

provision "subject to a right of way over the East 66 feet of said
property for the purpose of a proposed road". Contrary to Potters'
position, this road would benefit Heritage Park Plaza, Inc. (had
they not defaulted in their Contract of Purchase) in that it would
have given them direct access from Main Street to the balance of
the property to which the road would lead.

It would also benefit

Chadaz for the reason that if the Buyers defaulted and the property
be returned to Chadaz (which is, in fact, what happened) Chadaz
would have access from Main Street to the balance of their property
which was and is prime development property.

Furthermore, it

should be noted that the recorded deed simply refers to property
being sold subject to the 66 foot right of way for the purpose of
a proposed road.

The Supplemental Agreement elaborates upon the

fact that the road is to be completed by a given date and other
improvements are to be made.

It is Chadaz's position that these

are contractual rights which Chadaz could have enforced against the
buyers and that, in fact, the reservation of the right of way was
for adequate consideration and was recorded and was not conditioned
3

upon the other contractual provisions set forth in the Supplemental
Agreement being completed,
3. In response to paragraph 8, defendant Chadaz does not deny
that the Supplemental Agreement

(Chadaz Addendum "B") was not

recorded but Chadaz does dispute that Heritage Park Partners had
already sold the 1.58 acres to Heritage Park Plaza before the
Supplemental Agreement was signed.

As set forth above, although

the deeds were dated October 24, 1980, they were not, in fact,
recorded until December 9, 1980, which was after the signing of the
Supplemental Agreement.

There was also no sale between Heritage

Park Partners and Heritage Park Plaza, Inc., but rather simply a
transfer of property from one entity to another entity owned by the
same parties.

This is entirely consistent with the Supplemental

Agreement and the deeds which were, in fact, recorded after the
Supplemental Agreement was signed.
4.

In response to Potters' paragraphs 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13,

it is defendant Chadaz's position that these documents speak for
themselves and Chadaz does not agree with any conclusions reached
by the Potters.
5.

In response to Potters' paragraph 14, it is Chadaz's

position that the fact that the title company and/or Potters did
not discover the easement is not the fault of Chadaz and once the
easement was recorded it was constructive notice to the world of
its existence. This was recognized by the title insurance company
which had failed to list the easement on their title policy and
subsequently paid the title insurance benefits to Potters (see
4

Chadaz Brief at pages 31 and 32 and Potters' Addendum 9).
6.

In response to Potters' paragraph 15, it is Chadaz's

position that once the right of way was recorded the fact that the
subsequent grantors did not include the right of way in their
deeds, does not affect the validity of said right of way.
7.

in response to Potters' paragraph 16, Chadaz disagrees

completely with the conclusions set forth therein.

(See R. at p.

83, paragraph 7, Verified Objections of Defendant Reta Chadaz to
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiff's
Motion for Summary Judgment).
8. In response to Potter's paragraph 17, Chadaz specifically
denies these allegations.
9.

(See R. at p. 83 paragraph 5).

In response to Potter's paragraph 18, Chadaz denies these

allegations.

(See R. at p. 100, paragraph No. 4, also shown as

Potters' Addendum 13).
10.

In response to Potters' paragraph 19, it is Chadaz's

position that whether or not there are other accesses to the Chadaz
property it is irrelevant to the issues before the court.

The

Potter property shown on Potters' Addendum 12 is shown as two
separate parcels.

The east parcel which is adjacent to the Fronk

Chevrolet property was purchased from Jay Dee Harris Truck and
Equipment.

(82

It is this parcel

feet in width) upon which

Potters' building and improvements have been built.
3-9) .

(Tr. p. 40 In.

The west property is the property that was purchased from

Bywater (67 feet in width) and is where the disputed right of way
is located. This property is presently used as Potters' driveway.
5

(Tr. at p. 24 In. 19-24; also Tr. at p. 32 In 5-6)-

The

representation that the Bywater property separates the Potter
property from the Chadaz property to the south is only partially
true. The easement that was, in fact, reserved runs the entire
distance from Main Street to the Chadaz property, including the
property that is owned by Bywater; the importance of this being
that Chadaz does have the right of way which abuts to the remaining
property of Chadaz.
11.

In response to Potters' paragraph 20, it is Chadaz's

position that the right of way in question became a matter of
record on December 9, 1980 when it was recorded and has remained a
recorded right of way since that date.
12. In response to Potter's paragraph 21, Chadaz obtained the
Quit Claim Deed for the purpose of showing that Chadaz was the real
party in interest since Heritage Park Plaza, Inc. had defaulted in
the purchase of the property and the recorded easement did, in
fact, belong to Chadaz.
III.
CHADAZ IS NOT A "STRANGER TO THE DEED"
Plaintiffs go to great lengths in their efforts to convince
the court that "stranger to the deed" principles should be applied
to prevent Chadaz7s claimed easement. In so doing, the plaintiffs
Potters rely upon the case of Johnson v. Peck, (63 P.2nd 251, Utah,
1936) hereinafter referred to as the Johnson case and the case of
In the Matter of the Estate of Thomson v. Wade, (69 N.Y.2nd 570,
516 N.Y. Supp. 2nd 614; 509 N.E.2nd 309 New York 1987) hereinafter
6

referred to as the Wade case.
It is the defendant Chadaz7s position that neither the Johnson
case nor the Wade case applies and both can be distinguished from
our case. In addition to the arguments in her brief (see Brief of
Appellant, p. 11 par. 8 and pps. 22-28), Chadaz notes the following
distinctions between this case and the Johnson and Wade cases.
In the Johnson case the two lots involved were originally both
owned by "Baird".

One lot was sold (later claimed to be the

dominant parcel) without mention of any easement.

(In the case

this was the Johnson lot) . Later "Baird" sold the other lot (later
claimed to be the servient parcel) and in the deed of conveyance
attempted to reserve a 12 foot right of way to the property to the
west (Johnson lot).

The court held that since Baird had no right

or interest in the land to the west, having conveyed it away two
years before, the recital in the deed could not vest any right of
easement in a stranger to the deed.

The point being "Baird", the

common grantor of both lots, had no interest in the west lot
(Johnson lot) when he attempted to reserve the right of way to it.
It is the position of Chadaz that there is no "stranger to the
deed" in this case.

The trial court in its first Memorandum

Decision (Chadaz Addendum "E") stated:

"Stranger to the deed

principals are not particularly beneficial to either party."

In

this case the reservation of the right of way was first made in the
deed from Heritage Park Plaza, Inc. (grantor) to Villatek, Inc.
(see Chadaz Addendum "D") .

At the time of this conveyance the

grantor owned the property being sold to Villatek (servient parcel)
7

and also had a legally enforceable contract to purchase the
property to which the right of way would benefit (dominant parcel).
Chadaz still owned a security interest in the dominant parcel
subject to the right of way of Heritage Park, Inc., formerly
Heritage Park Partners, to purchase said property (see Potters'
Addendum 1 where grantee was Hillam Abstracting and Insurance
Agency, Inc., a Utah corporation, Trustee pursuant to a Trust
Agreement dated the 12th day of May, 1980) .
Addendum "A").

(See also Chadaz

The servient parcel was owned by Heritage Park

Plaza, Inc., formerly Heritage Park Partners but with a direct
contract obligation to Chadaz to reserve the right of way in
question.

(See Chadaz Addendum "B" paragraph 4) . It is noted that

both Heritage Park Plaza, Inc., formerly Heritage Park Partners,
and Chadaz had an interest in both the servient parcel and the
dominant parcel.

Heritage Park Plaza, formerly Heritage Park

Partners, as buyers and Chadaz as seller until the contract had
been paid in full.

The right of way served the interests of both

parties.
In both the Johnson case and the Wade case the grantors, who
attempted to reserve the right of way for the dominant tenant, no
longer had any interest in the dominant parcel which the right of
way would benefit. Accordingly, both cases are distinguished from
this case, and neither should be applied to prevent Chadaz's
easement.
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IV.
PLAINTIFFS ARE CHARGED WITH CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE
Plaintiffs set forth eight specific reasons why they should
not be charged with constructive notice of Chadaz's easement.

As

set forth below, none of these reasons should relieve plaintiffs
from being charged with constructive notice.
1.

Reason 1;

It is Chadaz's position that the Potters had

constructive notice of the reservation of the disputed easement
from the time of the recording of the Special Warranty Deed which
was recorded December 9, 1980 (see Chadaz Addendum "D"; see also
Brief of Appellant Chadaz at pp. 12 and 13).
2.

Reason 2;

The fact that the title company did not find

the easement (which had been recorded) does not affect defendant
Chadaz's position.

To the contrary, the title company did, in

fact, make payments to Potters under the provisions of the title
policies for failure to disclose said easement.

(See Chadaz Brief

pp. 31-32; see also record at pp. 152-153; and Policy of Title
Insurance of American Title Insurance Company, Potters7 Addendum
9).
3.

Reason 3:

It is Chadaz's position that the Special

Warranty Deed (Chadaz7s Addendum "D") speaks for itself.

There is

nothing in the deed that refers to a completion date for the road,
nor does there need to be.
4.

Reason 4;

It is Chadaz's position that Chadaz does not

need to be a party to this Agreement.
(formerly

Heritage

Park

Partners)
9

Heritage Park Plaza, Inc.
was

fulfilling

a

binding

obligation to Chadaz by making the deed subject to the easement.
The deed from Heritage Park Plaza, Inc. was simply a continued
fulfillment of that obligation and to place record title to the
easement

in Chadaz.

Upon reasonable

inquiry

concerning the

easement, the Potters could have easily determined the actual
ownership of the recorded easement.
5.

Reason 5;

It is the position of Chadaz that this is

irrelevant.
6.

Reason 6:

(See Maurice Staples' Affidavit, Potters

Addendum 13) placing these facts in issue.
7.

Reason 7:

It is the position of Chadaz that once the

easement was recorded and made a matter of record, it was notice to
the world and there would be a duty of inquiry upon any purchaser
of the property, which inquiry would have easily determined the
provisions of the supplemental contract.

It is Chadaz's further

position that the provisions of said contract are not necessary and
the recorded deed speaks for itself.
8. Reason 8: It is the position of Chadaz that the fact that
no plat maps or street plans show the easement does not affect the
validity of the recorded easement.
In addition to the eight reasons listed by plaintiffs, they
also rely upon the Diversified Equities, Inc. v. American Savings
and Loan Association case (739 P.2d 1133 (Utah App. 1987)).
reliance of Potter on this case is misplaced.

Their

In the Diversified

case the trust deed relied upon had been reconveyed on the record.
In our case the document creating the easement has never been
10

released of record.
actual

Chadaz relies on the recorded document as

or constructive notice.

The complicated

facts of the

Diversified case are clearly distinguishable from our case.
V.
THE EASEMENT WAS NEITHER ABANDONED NOR TERMINATED
Plaintiffs also argue that Chadaz's easement was abandoned or
terminated.

Defendant Chadaz relies on her original Brief in

response to plaintiffs Potters' argument on this point.

(See

Chadaz's original Brief, p. 28, par. B . ) .
In addition, and contrary to Potters7 argument that " . . . the
easement was only to be created by Villatek, Inc. constructing a
road . . .", it is the position of Chadaz that the right of way was
for the benefit of Heritage Park Plaza, Inc. (formerly Heritage
Park Partners), if it, in fact, completed purchase of the property.
It was to the benefit of Chadaz if the purchase was not completed.
It was also to the benefit of any subsequent purchaser if the
property was sold to them for the reason that it would be a benefit
in the development of said property.

It is Chadaz's position that

dominant and servient parcels still abut each other.

(See Chadaz's

original Brief pp. 13-15).
VI.
CHADAZ IS NOT BARRED FROM AN EASEMENT
BY EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL
The easement in this case is a recorded easement.
a prescriptive easement.

It is not

Based upon the arguments set forth in

Chadaz's original Brief, pp. 17-19, par. E. and pp. 30-31, par. D.,
there is certainly a genuine issue as to these material facts on
11

this point. The trial court indicated that "at least five of your
(Potters) issues are equitable factors all of which are always fact
sensitive." (See Tr. p. 5. In. 22 and 23).

Chadaz agrees with this

statement and contends that these material facts must be determined
before a ruling could be properly made on this point.
CONCLUSION
"When reviewing a summary judgment the party against whom the
judgment has been granted is entitled to have all of the facts
presented, and inferences fairly arising therefrom, considered in
the light most favorable to him." Applying this standard of review
to the facts of this case it is clear that summary judgment was
improper.

Accordingly, this case should be remanded to the trial

court for a trial on its merits.
DATED this

i^-

day of

<Q>to^W

1998.

MANN, HADFIELD & THORNE

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Reed W. Hadfield, certify that on the I day of
oA
i"ob<
, 1998, I served two copies of the attached "REPLY
BRIEF OF APPELLANT RETA CHADAZ", upon Marl in J. Grant, the counsel
for the appellee in this matter, and I served two copies of the
attached "BRIEF OF APPELLANT RETA CHADAZ" upon Gary Bywater,
defendant, and two copies upon Karleen C. Bywater, defendant, by
mailing them to them by first class mail with sufficient postage
prepaid to the following addresses:
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Marlin Grant
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84302

Karleen C. Bywater
375 North 600 West
Brigham City, Utah
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Refed W. Hadfiel^d
Attorneys for/Defendant/Appellant
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ADDENDUM
1.

Correction of errors discovered in Brief of Appellant.

ADDENDUM 1

ADDENDUM 1
CORRECTION OP ERRORS DISCOVERED IN "BRIEF OF APPELLANT"
It has come to appellant's attention that the "BRIEF OF
APPELLANT" previously filed by her, contains two (2) typographical
errors which should be corrected. The first appears on page 1,
just below the middle of the page, in the sentence which reads:
"When reviewing a summary judgment the party against
whom the judgment has been granted is entitled to have
all of the facts presented, and all of the inferences
fairly arising therefrom, considered in the light not
favorable to him". (underlining added)
The word "not" should be replaced with the word "most" so that
the sentence would read:
"When reviewing a summary judgment the party against
whom the judgment has been granted is entitled to have
all of the facts presented, and all of the inferences
fairly arising therefrom, considered in the light most
favorable to him". (underlining added)
The second error is found on page 19, in the fourth line from
the top. The year "1998" should be the year "1993", so that the
correct date reads: July 23, 1993.
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